Borderlands are wider than borders, and people make them so. In cases where two states have successfully extended de facto control until bumping up against each other, and where the populace on each side displays a uniformity of language, culture, ancestry, and allegiance, we speak of borders, not borderlands. Such cases have not been typical of the Greater Caribbean, to put it mildly. Here, relocation and remixing have been the rule rather than the exception, and newcomers have more often sought to duck central state authority than impose it. People have moved to where states could not follow; states have stalemated each other, creating space for people to move. The same seacoasts that give maps of the Caribbean the illusion of clarity have aided the creation of messy borderlands galore-some at the swampy fringes far from the centers of power, others in port alleyways where loyalty, color, and culture refused to align as authorities expected. Borderlands index the disjuncture between states' territorial claims and their effective reach. For that reason, popular initiative and mobility are at the center of their stories. people in other places, we ask no questions at all. As a result, significant swathes of experience
are invisible within the cumulative historiography of Caribbean borderlands and border crossers.
Our optic, I will suggest, has been distorted by attention to those cases and places where centralized investment of foreign capital generated centralized migratory streams: conditions that favored perceptions of racial and cultural distance and discouraged the building or acknowledgment of connections between newcomers and nationals. One might think, to judge by the case studies available, that by the early twentieth century messy borderlands were largely a thing of the past.
One might also think that subjugation to powerful employers and marginalization from surrounding societies were typical of the early-twentieth-century experience of Caribbeans abroad. Finally, one might think that the story of pre-World War II Caribbean labor migration was consistently a story of men. In each case, one would be wrong. The narrowness of scholarly attention has distorted the breadth of Caribbean historical experience.
I will frame my discussion of the scholarship around topics rather than debates, because on the crucial issue of midrange and long-term outcomes-for sending societies, for receiving societies, and for migrants and their descendants-we have not given ourselves enough grounds for debate. This is mainly because of the patterns in case study selection described above. In the terminology of social scientific research design, we have selected our sample based on key independent variables-employer control and sociocultural separation-and the constrained array of case studies we have produced fails to reflect the full range of variation in dependent variables, that is, individual and collective outcomes.
But case selection has not been our only problem. Historians' primary research has tended to be single-sited and time-limited and shaped by an understandable sympathy for the perspective of our subjects. Thus the basic story we have told about Caribbean border crossers has been one of struggle against oppression, hard-won community solidarity, and partial and painful incorporation into surrounding societies. This is an instance, I would suggest, where scholars' political sympathies regarding the past are a poor fit for the real needs of the present. As I write in September 2013, the Dominican Republic's Constitutional Court has just confirmed a law stripping citizenship from locally born children of nonpermanent immigrants, including seasonal workers, retroactive to 1929: scores of thousands of Dominicans of Haitian ancestry may become stateless as a result. Raids and deportations are being deployed against undocumented Guyanese in Barbados, amid accusations of profiling and harassment of the Guyanese community as a whole. Bahamian newspapers debate ways to withhold citizenship from children born locally to Haitian parents-roughly one-seventh of all children born in the Bahamas-even as Haitians form a mainstay of the service and construction labor force there. 2 Do not let the litany confuse you. These outcomes are not universal. Nor are the border systems that create them. Other policies can be chosen, if enough voters and legislators believe that the benefits of incorporation outweigh the costs to society of systematic illegalization (or the cost to employers of losing access to rightless workers). Even the US visa and citizenship regime became, for a few months in 2013, a topic of open debate, its costly dysfunction momentarily exposed to discussion rather than masked by yelping about taller walls at the border.
If we want to argue to lawmakers across the hemisphere that reforming current policies on entry, employment, and citizenship could have positive impact, we would be well served to be able to report that the past offers something other than a uniform panorama of marginalization and suffering. And indeed, the Caribbean past does. Observing human mobility around the Greater Caribbean across multiple generations, we see significant variation across time and space in migrants' degree of autonomy, integration, and advance. Permanent otherness and impoverishment have been the exception rather than the rule. A fuller picture of the past can and should serve as a call to action in the present.
Caribbean Borderlands and the Transition to Free Labor and Mobile Capital
Across the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, imperial competition in the Greater Caribbean made it possible for people who sought not to be ruled-indigenous groups, escaped slaves, and motley others-to use strategic alliances and targeted violence to keep wide territories outside the control of any imperial state. The Central American coastal lands known as Mosquitia, the inland stretches of the Guianas in northeast South America, and the peninsula of Florida in southeast North America were the largest of these regions, but the same pattern created heterogeneous peoples in the interstices of empire all around the region.
Geopolitical realignment at the end of the eighteenth century shrank the British footprint in the western Caribbean and the French footprint in the eastern Caribbean. From Louisiana to Bluefields to St. Lucia, this left multilingual populations with few ties to the state claiming treaty rights over them. Meanwhile, several generations would pass before the nascent continental republics could begin to contend for effective control of the zones of refuge created in the colonial era.
As the nineteenth century progressed, Caribbean borderlands would be remapped in a process driven by two distinct phenomena: the halting but inexorable dismantling of slavery around the region, and a fundamental shift in the relationship between investment and empire. As had been the case in earlier eras, population movements would still follow the labor demand generated by investment. But now those movements would take the form of free or contract migration rather than forced enslavement and transport, and capital would routinely be invested outside of the investors' governing state. Profits could be reaped beyond the borders of formal empire.
Both labor and capital were mobile in new ways, though the kinds of risks they faced were incommensurate. The uneven persistence of slavery (through 1834-38 
The Distribution of Scholarship on Postemancipation Border Crossing
I have traced this multigenerational story in some detail in order to underline how partial our scholarly research on borderlands and border crossers has been. We know a great deal about some of the above developments, and very little about others. There are reasons for this. Powerful employers generated the kind of migration that we easily see and track. It mattered to employers, it mattered to states, and (increasingly, as jobs became scarce in the 1920s) it mattered to local opponents.
Centrally organized labor recruitment created spatially concentrated settlements highly visible within receiving societies' human geography. This was all the more so given the conscious creation by employers like United Fruit and the Isthmian Canal Commission divided workforces, both by where they recruited and by how they organized and treated workers on arrival. 4 Recruited workers were separated from surrounding societies by perceived race, language, and cultural markers. As a result they were visible as outsiders in both the primary sources generated then and the secondary sources generated since. These secondary sources proliferated in the case of US-owned enterprises in particular: first in the form of boosterish reporting published for US readerships at the dawn of the twentieth century, then in the 1930s and again in the 1970s in nationalist denunciations published in the receiving societies.
In contrast, the kinds of migrations that kept borderlands borderlands, or created new ones, are much harder to track. Where population flows were decentralized and dispersed, where sojourners labored on their own account or for a large number of small entrepreneurs, where occupational segregation was not centrally planned and consistent but improvised and shifting, and where the languages, cultural knowledge, and perceived race of newcomers and locals overlapped, in all such instances, which is to say, in much of the Greater Caribbean, the story is much harder to recreate.
Indeed, it may be hard to see that any significant border crossing went on at all. Internal migrations were significant, too. In Colombia and across Central America, they brought ever-greater numbers of "national workers" into the rimland borderlands where exports boomed.
Jamaicans and their children were leaving Limón, Costa Rica, for Cuba and New York just as Costa Ricans from Guanacaste and the Central Highlands were seeking work in the banana zone in record numbers. Afro-Floridians were departing Florida by the thousands for New York, Detroit, and Chicago as Bahamian migration to Miami construction sites and truck farms reached a peak.
Placing internal migrations in supranational, region-wide context is a pending task. In sum, the fact that we know much more about certain kinds of migratory flows means we understand the borderlands less accurately overall. The hypervisibility of centralized, employerdriven transfers, and the relative invisibility of cases where people traveled on their own, dispersed, and mixed in, causes a retroactive erasure of messiness, alliance, and integration. 14 The problem is not that individual works on United Fruit Company labor, say, ignore heterogeneity and complexity; most of them make great efforts to reveal them. Rather, the problem is that the borderlands of the greatest heterogeneity and complexity are rarely studied at all.
Equally distorting is the fact that when we overfocus on migration driven by large employers we miss seeing women everywhere. As noted above, women crossed borders in significant numbers:
selling food, shelter, or comfort in boomtown ports such as Limón, Colón, and Santiago de Cuba;
working as domestic servants in settled cities with sizable bourgeoisies. From 1920 to 1924-the height of the British West Indian influx to New York-women outnumbered men within that flow.
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As the sugar boom waned in Cuba, Jamaican women's earnings outpaced men's. "There isn't a woman from your country who is not employed," a Jamaican journalist was told in Havana in 1928. Haiti and the Dominican Republic), for this early national period we have very few studies at all.
In the same decades, scholarship on rimland borderlands followed an equally generative but entirely separate path. As civil wars in Central America ground to a bloody halt in the mid-1990s, academics embraced the urgent task of excavating the historical roots of the societal divides that had made genocidal violence possible. Drawing intellectual tools from the international academic focus on the social construction of ethnicity, nationality, and race, historians and anthropologists combined painstaking archival research with oral history to track shifting collective identities across tumultuous centuries. 24 Several of these deep "histories of the present" focused on the Caribbean rimlands in particular, as did other, more chronologically limited studies. 25 Most recently, as interna-status has acquired urgency and consequences. Scholars have tracked how this new valence on the borderlands past has shifted collective identities in the borderlands present. 26 Despite the yeoman efforts of certain conference organizers, this literature on the long-term complexities of collective identity in Central America has remained largely separate from the scholarship on Caribbean migration to and through Central America. 27 With its multitude of case studies combining theoretical sophistication and longue durée empirical reconstructions, the Central Americanist literature offers invaluable insights into both the plasticity of identification and the durability of hierarchies, in each case shaped by politics local, regional, national, and international alike. This scholarship deserves to be more widely read by Caribbeanists, who will find parallels from Trinidad to Harlem, in addition to the more obvious resonance with Belize, Guyana, and Suriname.
Despite the disconnect described above, it is clear that thinking about borderlands-both about their historical reality and about the term's analytic utility-is something Caribbean scholars are eager to do. 28 This makes sense. Borderlands, as noted above, reflect the social and cultural consequences of the gaps between state claims and popular motion. Caribbean history can be read as a long-term counterpoint between human beings demanding mobility and powerful institutions attempting to limit it, in the form of chattel slavery in the eighteenth century, indenture in the nineteenth, or visa-based border control in the twentieth. Understanding how that counterpoint has remade hierarchies and collectives within Caribbean societies as well as between and beyond them is a crucial task.
New research trends offer promise. In a region of messy frontiers, none has been more painfully entangled than the Haitian-Dominican borderlands, site of an infamous massacre in 1937 and innumerable intimate connections before and since. 29 Particularly welcome, then, is a new initiative by young scholars, deeply engaged with migrants' rights activism on the island, to pioneer a collective rethinking of "transnational Hispaniola." 30 In a different mode, small stories from the edges turn out to have much to teach. Dogged researchers have offered unexpectedly illuminating windows onto the small-scale interactions that shaped borderland nooks ranging from the anglophone Colombian island of San Andrés to the Cayman archipelago to the neighborhoods of New Orleans.
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I hope that we can take these initiatives and interests as stepping stones to a widened agenda for Caribbean history as a whole. Perceptions of the importance of certain labor forms and certain capital flows have dictated a geography of collective attention that leaves too many places in the dark. Our mosaic of Caribbean history in the century after emancipation, I suggest, is disproportionately full of accounts of centrally organized movement across clear cultural boundaries. Our attention to the importance of labor is unduly tied to cases where migrants labored for high-profile foreign employers. A more accurate portrait of who we were before we became who we are today will require greater attention to the Caribbean's blended frontiers and the work that went on within them. These include spaces of encounter between patwa-, patois-, and Spanish-speaking Caribbeans in eastern Venezuela, eastern Panama, and East Harlem alike.
A final element I hope new work on borderlands history will illuminate is the widely varying gender balance of different Caribbean migratory circuits, and the ways this shaped sending and receiving communities. Relatedly, we should be asking about the impact of specific border-control regimes on Caribbean family practice. 32 In each case, this requires moving beyond the (accurate)
insistence that women traveled and women mattered, to ask how many women traveled, how often they moved on, how this impacted intercommunal contact and household formation, and how this shaped societies over time. Moreover, much more extensive research on women as workers, and the opportunities they have sought, will be needed if we are to better understand women in families and the obligations they have shouldered.
All of this would allow historians to speak with greater authority about issues that dominate debate over immigration policy today: assimilation, social spending, and second-generation outcomes. Rather than throw up our hands at the inflammatory anecdotes that pass for informed debate from Arizona to Santo Domingo, we could use historical data to inform the debate. 33 three cases-one longtime sending society, one long-ago receiving society, and one current migratory destination-we seem to see the results of Caribbean people's position as a vulnerable mobile labor force, exploited at the whim of international capital, marginalized from the more prosperous citizenries around them.
It is not that that story is not true. But it is a fragment we misread when we fail to see the whole.
The immiseration of Haiti despite its long generations as exporter of migrants, the marginalization of immigrants' descendants in Colón, and the exploitation of the Jamaicans and others laboring today under the H2 visa program are atypical when viewed against the panorama of Caribbean borderlands and border crossers as a whole. Struggle and adversity have been universal, yes. But for them to end in impoverishment and isolation has been the exception rather than the rule.
Awareness of that broader pattern should be for students of the Caribbean past a call to arms. Port-au-Prince, Colón, and Okeelanta are deeply unnatural artifacts, created by policies and patterns that could have been different. 34 Their entrenched poverty should inspire not cynicism or despair but anger. It did not have to be that way. A fuller comparative understanding of the history of circum-Caribbean borderlands and border crossers can help us make the case for change.
